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In March 2019, Nursultan Nazarbayev announced his resignation as president 
of Kazakhstan. While it is not surprising that he would want to resign after 30 
years in this role, the timing was unexpected. Nazarbayev had been Kazakhstan’s 
only president until then and had led the country since independence in 1991. His 
departure provides an opportunity to reflect on his tenure as a leader and on the 
unusual foreign policy trajectory that Kazakhstan has followed in comparison to its 
central Asian neighbours. While many will note the mixed legacy that Nazarbayev 
leaves, in this article we focus on a distinguishing characteristic of his governance, 
with the emphasis on the organizing principle of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy—
multivector diplomacy or, more simply, multivectorism.1 Over the past 30 years 
Kazakhstan has achieved economic and diplomatic success in a difficult region of 
the world, caught between Russia and China. In this period Kazakhstan sustained 
its independence, grew economically through the export of its natural resources, 
and established a respected international reputation for diplomacy.
The experience of Kazakhstan presents a theoretical puzzle. Kazakhstan is a 
secondary power—a state with moderate regional influence and moderate interna-
tional recognition—that has negotiated relationships with its Great Power neigh-
bours without becoming a client state. It shares a border with China, with which 
it has positive trade and diplomatic relationships, yet it is not dominated by China. 
Similarly, it is adjacent to Russia, and has a large ethnic Russian population, yet 
is not controlled by Russia. In 2014 Russia invaded Crimea, sending ripples of 
concern throughout the post-Soviet region. Even long-time allies of Russia, such as 
President Lukashenko of Belarus, have expressed concerns about Russian influence 
following the seizure of Crimea.2 It is noteworthy that under these circumstances 
Kazakhstan has both asserted its sovereignty and maintained positive relations with 
Russia.
In this article we have two goals: (1) to analyse the success of Kazakhstan’s 
multivectorism; and (2) to engage in the related theoretical discussion as to how 
* The authors would like to thank colleagues, including Michael Aleprete and Jeff Legro, and the anonymous
reviewers for their generous scholarly comments at different stages of this article’s development.
1 The terms multivector foreign policy, multivectorism and multivector diplomacy are employed interchange-
ably in this article.
2 Andrew Higgins, ‘As Putin pushes a merger, Belarus resists with language, culture and history’, New York Times, 29 
June 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/world/europe/russia-belarus-putin-lukashenko.html. (Unless 
otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 28 March 2020.)
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this secondary power has been able to manage its Great Power neighbours in 
such a way as to promote its own economic, political and diplomatic interests. 
The article also addresses gaps in the literature, as the foreign policy strategy of 
secondary powers is under-theorized, and there is even less theoretical analysis of 
the foreign policy of central Asian states. Several factors contribute to explaining 
the absence of theoretical analysis of central Asia. First, scholars have generally 
treated ‘post-Soviet central Asia’ as a bloc,3 imposing a false unity on the countries 
of the region, which differ in terms of their resources, population size and compo-
sition, level of economic development, strategies and goals.4 Second, since 2001 
much of the international interest in the area has revolved around the problem of 
combating terrorism, especially in relation to the war in Afghanistan. Third, apart 
from its natural resources, the region has simply not been perceived as strate-
gically important. But things are changing, and there are several reasons why a 
theoretical discussion of Kazakhstan is timely: the rise of China has made central 
Asia more significant internationally;5 Nazarbayev’s departure marks a pivotal 
point in the country’s history and creates a potential for vulnerability, owing to 
the complex situation surrounding the transition of power; and a foreign policy 
pursued consistently over a period of 30 years has left a legacy which can now be 
effectively analysed and possibly applied by other states.
This article proceeds in four stages. We begin by defining multivectorism and 
identifying how we might understand it from the realist perspective and the 
theoretical model of omni-enmeshment suggested by Evelyn Goh in her work on 
south-east Asia. In the second part we consider how Kazakhstan’s foreign policy 
of multivectorism models omni-enmeshment and the complex balancing of 
power suggested by Goh.6 We do this by examining the variety of ways in which 
Kazakhstan has defended its sovereignty in the region and used highly visible and 
targeted diplomatic efforts to manage the interests of the Great Powers while 
avoiding their regional and international agendas. In the third part we use a case-
study of Kazakhstan’s complex balancing with regard to its energy resources to 
further illustrate our argument. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of omni-
enmeshment and complex balancing as a strategy for secondary powers.
What is ‘multivectorism’? How does IR theory explain it?
Kazakhstan has followed a multivector foreign policy, a term used to describe ‘a 
policy that develops foreign relations through a framework based on a pragmatic, 
3 With the exception of some regional and country experts.
4 As Marlene Laruelle notes, Kazakhstan is the ‘economic engine’ of the region, producing more than 50% 
of regional GDP, and is therefore in a different category from any of its much poorer neighbours: Marlene 
Laruelle, ‘Kazakhstan’s dilemma on Eurasian and central Asian integrations’, in Daniel L. Burghart and 
Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds, Central Asia in the new era of sovereignty (New York: Lexington, 2018), p. 400.
5 Rosemary Foot, ‘Remembering the past to secure the present: Versailles legacies in a resurgent China’, Inter-
national Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 143–60.
6 Evelyn Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia’, International Security 32: 2, Winter 2007–
2008, pp. 113–57.
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non-ideological foundation’.7 In explaining the goals of this strategy, President 
Nazarbayev stated that a multivector foreign policy means the development of 
friendly and predictable relations with all states that play a significant role in world 
affairs and are of practical interest to the country.8 Its essence lies in the establish-
ment and development of mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries. This 
idea undergirded the Strategy on the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan 
as a Sovereign State, published in May 1992. According to this document, the main 
goal of foreign policy is to create a favourable external environment and provide 
support for the stable development of the country through political and economic 
reforms.9 In practice, multivectorism has become a ‘form of relational power 
allowing a weaker state to mitigate the dilemmas of dependence while engaging 
in an asymmetrical relationship’.10 Alexander Cooley argues that Kazakhstan, 
along with other central Asian states, has used the competition among Russia, 
China and the United States to serve its own interests by playing the Great Powers 
off against one another and thereby to ‘extract increased benefits, assistance, and 
better contractual terms’.11 Kazakhstan has used multivectorism to manage its 
challenging geopolitics.
How does current foreign policy theory explain Kazakhstan’s choice of multi-
vectorism? Moreover, can existing theory explain the country’s success in develop-
ing and maintaining a multivector foreign policy? Given the apparently rational, 
strategic approach of multivectorism and its involvement of Great Powers, realism 
is a logical place to look first for theoretical explanations. Balance of power theory 
argues that states form alliances with other states to protect themselves from the 
superior capabilities of a potential hegemon.12 Bandwagoning is the opposite strate-
gic choice, involving aligning with the stronger power.13 Stephen Walt argues that 
balancing is the more prevalent strategy, and that states will only bandwagon when 
7 Reuel R. Hanks, ‘“Multi-vector politics” and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geo-strategic player in central 
Asia’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11: 3, 2009, p. 259; see also Raikhan Kaliyeva, ‘Kazahstan v 
global’nom mire: obzor situazii’, Diplomatiya Zharshysi [Kazakhstan in the global world: situation review, 
Diplomatic Herald] 1: 11, 2007, pp. 181–6.
8 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Era nezavisimosti [Era of independence] (Astana: B. I., 2017), pp. 168–75, https://elbasy.
kz/sites/default/files/pagefiles/2019-06/423d7253d66cad2c6f68758bcaf33782.pdf. See also Mnogovektornaya 
diplomatiya na praktike—Kazahstan [Multivector diplomacy in practice – Kazakhstan], Central Asian Analyti-
cal Network, 20 April 2018, http://caa-network.org/archives/12956.
9 Meirambek Bagarin, ‘Strategiya stanovleniya i razvitiya Kazahstana kak suverennogo gosudarstva—vernyy 
kurs, zadannyy presidentom N. Nazarbayevim’ [The strategy of formation and development of Kazakhstan 
as a sovereign state is the right course set by the President N. Nazarbayev], Kazinform, 1 Sept 2010, https://
www.inform.kz/ru/strategiya-stanovleniya-i-razvitiya-kazahstana-kak-suverennogo-gosudarstva-vernyy-
kurs-zadannyy-prezidentom-n-nazarbaevym_a2299544. 
10 Nicola P. Contessi, ‘Foreign and security policy diversification in Eurasia: issue splitting, co-alignment, and 
relational power’, Problems of Post-Communism 62: 5, July 2015, p. 301. 
11 Alexander Cooley, Great games, local rules: the new Great Power contest in central Asia (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012), p. 9; Christopher Layne, ‘The US–China power shift and the end of the Pax Americana’, 
International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 89–112; Astrid H. M. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, ‘Will Trump 
make China great again? The Belt and Road Initiative and international order’, International Affairs 94: 2, 
March 2018, pp. 231–50. 
12 Stephen M. Walt, Origins of alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 18. See also Seng Tan, 
‘Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy’, International Affairs 
96: 1, Jan. 2020, pp. 131–48.
13 Randall Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for profit: bringing the revisionist state back in’, International Security 19: 
1, 1994, p. 74.
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they are weak, when there are no other allies available, and when they believe it is 
possible to appease the rising hegemon. However, these arguments about balancing 
and bandwagoning do not adequately explain Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy, 
which has involved some aspects of both balancing against and bandwagoning 
with three different Great Powers (China, Russia, the United States) and occasion-
ally engages with the EU  on  economic matters, all at the same time—a strategy 
seemingly counter to realist predictions. The ‘simplistic dichotomy’ of balancing 
or bandwagoning fails to account for the complexity of Kazakhstan’s approach to 
foreign policy and its strategic preferences.14 In addition, with its narrow focus on 
military power and economic wealth, realism fails to account for the variety of 
mechanisms with which Kazakhstan, and other secondary powers, can engage the 
Great Powers. Realism is theoretically most persuasive in explaining the actions 
of Great Powers, tending to underexplain the choices and methods of other states.
An alternative theoretical approach stems from Evelyn Goh’s work on the 
foreign policy strategies of south-east Asia in relation to the United States and 
China. Both the south-east Asian and central Asian states share the characteristic 
of being secondary or tertiary states in a region involved in Great Power compe-
tition. Goh argues that, in response to the rise of China, the south-east Asian 
states have followed strategies of ‘omni-enmeshment’ towards major powers and 
a complex balance of influence. Omni-enmeshment refers
to the process of engaging with a state so as to draw it into deep involvement into [sic] 
international and regional society, enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and 
relationships, with the long-term aim of integration. In the process, the target state’s inter-
ests are redefined, and its identity possibly altered, so as to take into greater account the 
integrity and order of the system.15
In Goh’s view, the south-east Asian states are trying to avoid an unstable multi-
polar world and being forced to choose between the United States and China.16 
In doing so, they seek to include all the major powers in the region’s issues and 
affairs, with the goal of creating ‘overlapping spheres of influence in the region 
that are competitive but positive-sum’ and that avoid violent competition between 
major powers.17 Furthermore, south-east Asian states hope that through drawing 
Great Powers into participation in regional organizations they will be able to 
create ‘greater strategic interdependence’ among them, making direct conflict 
14 Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order’, p. 118.
15 Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order’, p. 121. Robert A. Pape argues that weaker states unable to balance 
through military power may instead engage in ‘soft balancing’. We argue that omni-enmeshment explains 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy better than ‘soft balancing’ because the country has a complex foreign policy 
aimed at multiple Great Powers, not just the one discussed in the ‘soft balancing’ literature. ‘Soft balancing’ is 
also an inadequate explanation because Kazakhstan’s multivectorism involves more than balancing behaviour, 
including elements of bandwagoning. See Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order’, p. 132; Robert A. Pape, 
‘Soft balancing against the United States’, International Security 30: 1, 2005, pp. 7–45.
16 Kai He and Mingjiang Li, ‘Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, 
regional actors and beyond’, International Affairs 96: 1, Jan. 2020, pp. 1–8; Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Evasive balanc-
ing: India’s unviable Indo-Pacific strategy’, International Affairs 96: 1, Jan. 2020, pp. 75–94; Brendan Taylor, ‘Is 
Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy an illusion?’, International Affairs 96: 1, Jan. 2020, pp. 95–110.
17 Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order’, p. 129.
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too costly.18 This strategy involves indirect military balancing against China, by 
seeking continued US military dominance in the region, and regional balancing 
that involves multiple players and non-military forms of influence, such as in the 
political and economic arenas. As Goh argues,
the notion of complex balancing in south-east Asia takes into account nonmilitary tools, and 
it is not pegged rigorously to the goal of redressing the balance of military capability. Rather, 
it is aimed at increasing the number of major states that have a stake in regional security.19
In pursuit of this goal, states may use a variety of mechanisms to gain influence, 
such as membership in intergovernmental and regional organizations, declarations 
of national sovereignty, foreign investment deals and diplomatic manoeuvres.
Observation of central Asian states’ behaviour and their investment of politi-
cal resources suggests that omni-enmeshment and complex balancing offer better 
explanations of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy than realism. In the following sections 
we will identify the ways in which Kazakhstan has sought to create a web of politi-
cal and economic relationships with the Great Powers engaged in the region. Rather 
than engaging in direct balancing or bandwagoning behaviour, which would 
constrain the actions of the state in a clientelistic manner, Kazakhstan has made 
a consistent and multifaceted effort to form ties with all the Great Powers. This 
policy involves more than Kazakhstan trying to ‘hedge its bets’ and avoid choosing 
alliances.20 Instead, Kazakhstan has a strategic preference for ‘enmeshing’ Great 
Powers in complex exchanges and positive-sum relations with the region through 
building regional institutions and pursuing multilateral approaches.21 Moreover, 
these ties with the Great Powers are not clientelistic in nature. Kazakhstan uses its 
valuable natural resources to engage in successful complex balancing. We argue 
below that this strategy resembles the omni-enmeshment and complex balancing 
that Goh observes in south-east Asia, where states are facing a similar struggle to 
maintain autonomy in a region of Great Power competition. Indeed, we conclude 
that omni-enmeshment, and its more narrow articulation in Kazakhstan’s multi-
vectorism, may be an effective strategy for secondary states seeking to assure their 
autonomy in regions where they are caught between the interests of Great Powers.
Multivectorism as a form of omni-enmeshment
Kazakhstan has strong cultural, linguistic and historical ties with Russia, and since 
independence Moscow has been a valued strategic partner. However, Kazakh-
18 Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order’, p. 123.
19 Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order’, p. 139.
20 Anar Valiyev and Narmina Mamishova argue that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy towards Russia is one of ‘hedg-
ing’, moving back and forth between balancing against and bandwagoning with Russia; see Anar Valiyev and 
Narmina Mamishova, ‘Azerbaijan’s foreign policy towards Russia since independence: compromise achieved’, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19: 2, 2019, pp. 269–91. However, Kazakhstan’s multivectorism is more 
than ‘hedging’, as the policy engages multiple Great Powers, not one, and has been relatively consistent over 
time, not fluctuating between balancing or bandwagoning with Russia.
21 Alexander Libman and Anastassia V. Obydenkova, ‘Regional international organizations as a strategy of 
autocracy: the Eurasian Economic Union and Russian foreign policy’, International Affairs 94: 5, Sept. 2018, 
pp. 1037–58.
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stan also has an interest in preventing Russia from restoring a ‘sphere of privi-
leged interests’, especially following the seizure of Crimea.22 Multivectorism, as a 
form of omni-enmeshment, involves several factors, including clear assertion and 
protection of state sovereignty to avoid becoming a client state of any of the Great 
Powers, but especially of Russia, given its historical role as a colonial power in the 
region. Indeed, while Kazakhstan is seeking to engage with the Great Powers, it is 
not trying to build a central Asian society similar to the EU. China has generally 
been seen as less of a threat to Kazakhstani sovereignty because it unwaveringly 
protects its own sovereignty (including that claimed over Taiwan) and the sover-
eignty of other states. Since the 1950s, China has engaged with African and Asian 
countries according to its five principles of peaceful coexistence, which emphasize 
respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in a country’s 
internal affairs.23 Kazakhstan has used a diverse range of mechanisms to maintain 
the delicate balance entailed in protecting state sovereignty while ensuring positive 
relations with Russia, China, the United States and the EU. While Russia and 
China border on Kazakhstan and are necessarily of most immediate concern, the 
influence of the EU and US is significant and requires management, particularly in 
the areas of security and trade. An important mechanism in this process has been 
the development of regional institutions and multilateral approaches to regional 
problems in such a way as to draw the Great Powers into sustained, regularized 
positive-sum engagement with central Asia. 
Assertions of sovereignty and independence 
The Kazakhstani government advocates a distinct view of its identity as a 
Eurasian state that asserts its sovereignty and identifies a historic narrative in 
which its identity is not dependent on Russia. Through this ‘Eurasian’ identity, 
embraced in the early post-Soviet years, Kazakhstan was able to recognize both 
its proximity to, and its separation from, Russia. Over time, the Kazakhstani and 
Russian understandings of what it means to be Eurasian diverged. The Russian 
definition emphasizes the history of the Mongol empire in the centre of Eurasia 
and identifies Russia as the successor power. This narrative highlights the role of 
the Soviet Union in ‘creating’ Kazakhstan through the Kazakh Socialist Republic 
in the Soviet era.24 Kazakhstan, meanwhile, identifies a different foundational 
political entity in the Turkic khaganate preceding both the Mongol empire and 
the Soviet Union. In this view, the Kazakh identity is both a separate civiliza-
tion and a different ethnicity within Eurasia. In other words, while the Russians 
see Eurasia as an area with a monolithic history dominated by the Soviet era, 
which constructed the central Asian states, the Kazakhstani perspective is that of 
a Eurasia encompassing both Russian and Kazakh civilizations as ‘two different 
22 Mnogovektornaya diplomatiya na praktike [Multivector diplomacy in practice].
23 Yunling Zhang, ‘China and its neighbourhood: transformation, challenges and grand strategy’, International 
Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, p. 838.
24 Dmitry Shlapentokh, ‘Kazakh and Russian history and its geopolitical implications’, Insight Turkey 18: 4, Fall 
2016, pp. 143–63.
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cultural and geopolitical universes’.25 These were united for a brief time, but had 
separate histories before and after the Soviet era. Kazakhstan has been willing 
to defend this idea of a separate history both within and outside its borders. In 
2015, officials arrested Kazakhs who claimed that ‘Russian and Kazakh history 
are closely integrated and that therefore Kazakhstan should be geopolitically and 
economically close to Russia’.26 The Kazakh understanding of Eurasia also has an 
ideological component that separates it from the Russian understanding of the 
term. Eurasianism within Kazakhstan incorporates the notion of cultural ties with 
Europe and the West, linkages that promote values of multi-ethnicity, tolerance 
and religious understanding.27 This ideological understanding of Eurasianism 
supports both multivectorism and an inclusive understanding of Kazakh national 
identity. That said, multivectorism is a foreign policy strategy, not an ideology. 
The Kazakhstani government invests in promoting this narrative. In 2015, it 
sponsored a massive celebration of Kazakhstan’s 550-year history as a nation, 
marking its origin with the Kazakh khanate founded by two khans, Kerei and 
Zhanibek, in 1465.28 According to the government, ‘the Kazakh khanate’ became 
known in western Europe around 1562. It appeared as ‘Cassackia’ on a map drawn 
by Anthony Jenkinson, an English diplomat and traveller, to fill in the area between 
‘Tashkent’ and ‘Siberia’.29 What makes this anniversary of interest is that prior to 
2015 it had never been commemorated. Indeed, on the English-language website 
of the Kazakhstani Embassy in Washington DC, a justification for the celebration 
notes the importance of the occasion in uniting the multi-ethnic populations of 
Kazakhstan and teaching younger generations about their history.30 Consistent 
with Eric Hobsbawm’s idea of the use of ancient materials for novel purposes, 
this ‘invention of tradition’ promoted social cohesion—a clearly articulated goal 
of the government—and legitimized institutions and authority.31 While there is 
no doubt that remembrance and a territorial identity are important in terms of 
developing an identity for a nation,32 in this case the intended audience was as 
much external as internal, especially given that this celebration came only a year 
after the Russian annexation of Crimea. While we do not give credence to the 
notion that northern Kazakhstan will be the next Crimea,33 there are other ways 
in which Russia pushes the boundaries of Kazakhstani sovereignty. For example, 
in 2014, at a summit in Shanghai, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that ‘the 
25 Shlapentokh, ‘Kazakh and Russian history’, p. 147.
26 Shlapentokh, ‘Kazakh and Russian history’, p. 143.
27 Golam Mostafa, ‘The concept of “Eurasia”: Kazakhstan’s Eurasia policy and its implications’, Journal of Eura-
sian Studies 4: 2, 2013, pp. 160–70.
28 ‘Kazahskoi gosudarstvennosti v 2015 gody ispolnitsya 550 let—Nazarbayev’ [Kazakh statehood in 2015 will 
mark 550 years—Nazarbayev], Tengri News, 22 Oct. 2014, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/kazah-
skoy-gosudarstvennosti-2015-godu-ispolnitsya-550-let-263876/.
29 Why celebrate 550 years of Kazakh statehood? (Washington DC: Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, n.d.), 
https://kazakhembus.com/about-kazakhstan/history/khanates.
30 Why celebrate 550 years of Kazakh statehood?.
31 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: inventing tradition’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, The inven-
tion of tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 9.
32 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, extended edn (New 
York: Verso, 1991; first publ. 1983), pp. 163–86. 
33 See n. 43 below.
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Kazakhs never had any statehood’,34 a comment which led President Nazarbayev 
to threaten to leave the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). 
The opening of a new National Museum of the Republic of Kazakhstan in July 
2014 was another assertion of national identity separate from Russia. The Hall of 
History in the museum emphasizes a long, independent narrative of Kazakhstan, 
focusing on its history from the fifteenth century to the twentieth. The exposition 
reveals the main stages of the formation and development of the Kazakh khanate, 
and the national liberation wars and uprisings of the Kazakh people. The museum 
is a reflection of the holistic historical image of Kazakhstan as the cradle of the 
great steppe civilization.35
In April 2017, President Nazarbayev introduced a cultural programme entitled 
‘Looking into the future: modernization of public consciousness’,36 which was later 
transformed into a ‘Programme on modernization of national identity’ (rukhani 
zhangyru, which may also be translated as ‘spiritual revival’), to initiate the cultural 
and spiritual awakening of Kazakhstan, helping the nation to connect with its roots 
and, at the same time, to adapt and succeed in the modern world.37 The programme 
aimed to introduce the wider world to the cultural richness of modern Kazakhstan 
through tours of the country’s prestigious opera and ballet companies, and promo-
tion of the work of Kazakh musicians, writers, film-makers and artists.38 
Another interesting facet of the Kazakhstani effort both to articulate its 
independence from Russia and strengthen its modern image is the 2017 decision 
to shift from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. Kazakhstani officials believe that 
adoption of the new alphabet will allow the country to integrate into the global 
economy faster, boost national identity, make it easier to communicate with the 
outside world, and help children learn English faster. According to President 
Nazarbayev, the transition to the Latin alphabet meets an internal need for the 
development and modernization of the Kazakh language.39 
This is not, however, the first change of alphabets in Kazakhstan, nor is it the 
only one to be influenced by external political events. The Latin alphabet was used 
34 Farangis Najibullah, ‘Putin downplays Kazakh independence, sparks angry reaction’, RFE/RL, 3 Sept. 2014, 
www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-putin-history-reactionnation/26565141.html.
35 See the YouTube video presenting the new National Museum of RK, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=u1mSN1gZT28; also materials regarding museums in Kazakhstan on the page of the Kazakhstan 
Embassy in Russia, https://www.kazembassy.ru/rus/interesnoe_o_kazaxstane/stati/?cid=0&rid=169. 
36 Nursultan Nazarbayev, ‘Vzglyad v budushee: modernizatziya obshestvennogo soznaniya’ [A look into the 
future: the modernization of public consciousness], president’s article delivered at press conference, 12 April 
2017, http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/akorda_news/press_conferences/statya-glavy-gosudarstva-vzglyad-
v-budushchee-modernizaciya-obshchestvennogo-soznaniya.
37 Rukhani zhangyru comprises a range of different projects, such as Aul—el besigi (to improve infrastructure 
and quality of life of rural residents), Oz zheringdi tanip bil’ (to expand and deepen the knowledge of Kazakh 
history, literature and traditions), Sacred geography of Kazakhstan (to identify and protect the cultural and 
geographical belt of shrines in Kazakhstan), 100 new faces of Kazakhstan (to identify true heroes of modern 
society and use them as role models) and so on. See Meirambek Baigarin, ‘Programma Rukhani zhangyru—
resultati i noviye proekti’ [Ruhani zhangyru program—results and new projects], Kazinform, 26 Oct. 2018, 
https://www.inform.kz/ru/programma-ruhani-zhangyru-rezul-taty-i-novye-proekty_a3437371. 
38 Todd Wood, ‘Kazakhstan offers spiritual revival—not “multiculturalism”’, Washington Times, 25 July 2018, 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jul/25/kazakhstan-moves-toward-spiritual-revival-instead-/.
39 Yekaterina Suslova, ‘Kuda yazik dovedet: pochemy Kazahstan pereshel na latinitzy’ [Where the language 
will lead: why Kazakhstan switched to Latin alphabet], Gazeta.ru, 21 Feb. 2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/
politics/2018/02/20_a_11657323.shtml.
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between 1929 and 1940, when it was known as the Yanalif or New Turkic alpha-
bet.40 In 1940, a growing fear of pan-Turkic sentiment among Kazakhs, Uzbeks 
and other Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union influenced Moscow’s decision 
to adopt the Cyrillic script for Kazakh and other Turkic languages in order to 
promote Russian culture and prevent the development of a shared non-Soviet 
common identity. Thus some political experts, such as Dossym Satpayev, see 
Cyrillic as part of Russia’s colonial project, and thus the recent switch to the Latin 
alphabet can be seen as anti-imperial and anti-Russian.41
Kazakhstan also asserts its sovereignty through its economic relationships. It 
was one of the founding members of the Russian-led EEU, launched in 2014. 
Kazakhstan joined the EEU because of its economic and political ties with 
Russia, notably a 7,000-kilometre shared border and robust bilateral trade.42 In 
addition, the Russian minority in Kazakhstan makes up a larger percentage of 
the population than in any other post-Soviet state.43 In the earlier years of his 
presidency, Nazarbayev had proposed a more expansive vision for a Eurasian 
union: for example, during a meeting in 1994 with the staff and students of 
M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University he outlined a vision for a Eurasian
union with a common citizenship, joint parliament, council of defence ministers
and monetary union.44 However, by 2014, and especially after Russia’s seizure
of Crimea, the Kazakhstani government became more cautious about the EEU
project and supported a more limited idea of the grouping, rejecting Russia’s plan
to establish a monetary union.45 The EEU founding treaty, adopted in 2014, was
according to Vieira ‘less comprehensive’ than that originally proposed and more
of an economic than a political union, reflecting the positions of both Belarus and
Kazakhstan.46 Marlene Laruelle argues that since the Russian annexation of Crimea 
40 ‘Kazahstan perehodit na latinskii alfavit’ [Kazakhstan switches to the Latin alphabet], BBC News (Russian 
edn), 27 Oct. 2017, https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-41773674.
41 Andrew Higgins, ‘Kazakhstan cheers new alphabet, except for all those apostrophes’, New York Times, 1 Jan. 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/world/asia/kazakhstan-alphabet-nursultan-nazarbayev.html.
42 ‘Kazakhstan trade at a glance: most recent values’, World Integrated Trade Solution, 2017, https://wits.worldbank.
org/CountrySnapshot/en/KAZ. 
43 As of 2019, ethnic Russians constituted 19% of the population of Kazakhstan: see Pavel Zlobin, ‘Bolshe—ne 
luchshe. Chem grozit Kazahstany demograficheskii bum?’ [More is not better. How demographic boom 
may threaten Kazakhstan?], online edition of Komsomolskaya Pravda, 15 Oct. 2019, https://www.kp.kz/
daily/27043.3/4107445/; also ‘Etnicheskaya karta Kazahstana: Kazahov bolshe, Evropeizev men’she, tretii 
mononazional’nii region’ [Ethnic map of Kazakhstan: more Kazakhs, fewer Europeans, third mono-ethnic 
region], Vlast, 30 April 2019, https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/32977-etniceskaa-karta-kazahstana-kazahov-bolse-
evropejcev-mense-tretij-mononacionalnyj-region.html. Given its large Russian minority, there have been 
claims that northern Kazakhstan could be the next Crimea. However, Marlene Laruelle argues convincingly 
that Kazakhstan is not Ukraine and concerns about Russian irredentism in Kazakhstan are overblown. As she 
says, the Russian government has not supported any secessionist or nationalist claims by Russians in Kazakh-
stan; many Russian minorities in Kazakhstan are grateful for the economic stability in the country; and as a 
result of demographic shifts and immigration, the Russian population has been shrinking. For more informa-
tion on this topic, see Marlene Laruelle, ‘Why no Kazakh Novorossiya? Kazakhstan’s Russian minority in a 
post-Crimea world’, Problems of Post-Communism 65: 1, 2018, pp. 65–78. 
44 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Strategiya vechnoi druzhbi: Kazahstan—Rossiya [The strategy of eternal friendship: 
Kazakhstan—Russia] (Moscow: Tipografiya Novosti, 2000), pp. 380–87. 
45 Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, ‘Eurasian integration: elite perspectives before and after the Ukraine crisis’, 
Post-Soviet Affairs 32: 6, 2016, p. 571.
46 Vieira, ‘Eurasian integration’, p. 571.
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the Kazakhstani government has resisted further integration within the EEU.47 
Kazakhstan refused to support increased duties on Ukrainian exports within the 
EEU or any negative economic measures against Ukraine after the 2014 war;48 it 
also declined to join Russia in imposing retaliatory economic sanctions on the EU 
and recognized the Ukrainian government of Petro Poroshenko.49 Even its strong 
political and economic ties with Russia were not sufficient to compel Kazakh-
stan’s cooperation with Moscow within the EEU in any actions that supported the 
seizure of Crimea. Indeed, President Nazarbayev publicly stated that Kazakhstan 
would leave the EEU if membership threatened its independence.50 
Kazakhstan’s resistance to Russian dominance and broader regional coopera-
tion is also evident in other matters. On 15 March 2018, Russia’s foreign minister 
Sergei Lavrov proposed that Kazakhstan reconsider its visa-free regime for US 
citizens, saying that agreements of this type should be ‘coordinated’ with the 
EEU. In response, the Kazakhstani foreign ministry spokesman Anuar Zhain-
aqov defended Kazakhstan’s right to independent action, saying that ‘introducing 
or abolishing visa requirements for foreign citizens is the right of any sovereign 
country’.51 He then added that the ‘EEU is not a political alliance but a group created to 
tackle economic issues ...  When they outlined the agreement on the creation of the 
EEU, member states agreed that issues related to national sovereignty be excluded from the 
group’s competence.’52 
Kazakhstan has followed a similar strategy of asserting independence within 
the UN. Again, we can see this most clearly in relation to the Crimea situation. On 
27 March 2014 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution stating the Crimea 
referendum on Russia’s seizure of the peninsula was invalid. On this impor-
tant vote, the Kazakhstani government abstained rather than vote in support of 
Russia.53 During its two years on the UN Security Council (2017–2018), Kazakh-
stan chose not to vote with Russia 15 times; indeed, on most occasions when the 
UN Security Council failed to achieve a unanimous vote, Kazakhstan did not 
vote with Russia. Kazakhstan even abstained on a Russian resolution condemning 
US air strikes in Syria. In fact, Kazakhstan rarely voted with Russia on resolu-
tions related to Syria, one of the most important foreign policy issues in the UN 
Security Council involving Moscow.
Kazakhstan has also expressed its independence from Russian interests by 
conducting regular joint military exercises with NATO, known as Steppe Eagle.54 
47 Laruelle, ‘Kazakhstan’s dilemma’, p. 399.
48 Vieira, ‘Eurasian integration’, p. 573.
49 Vieira, ‘Eurasian integration’, p. 572.
50 Micha’el M. Tanchum, ‘Kazakhstan’s western rebalancing: the changing strategic contours of Eurasian 
connectivity’, Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies 10: 20, 2015, p. 2. 
51 ‘Astana rejects Lavrov’s statement on visa-free travel to Kazakhstan for Americans’, RFE/RL, Kazakh service, 
16 March 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/astana-rejects-lavrov-statement-visa-free-travel-americans/29104597.
html.
52 ‘Astana rejects Lavrov’s statement on visa-free travel’ (emphasis added).
53 UN General Assembly, ‘General Assembly adopts resolution calling upon states not to recognize changes in 
status of Crimea region’, press release, 27 March 2014, https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm.
54 As the United States is a leading member of NATO, Kazakhstan’s relationship with NATO is also in part a 
reflection of its relationship with the United States.
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Kazakhstan participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and in 2006 
signed an individual partnership action plan with the alliance.55 The Kazakhstani 
government has reduced its dependence on Russian weapons by increasing its 
interoperability with NATO and purchasing more weapons and military equip-
ment from Europe.56 Given Russia’s animosity towards NATO, the dominant 
role of the US within the alliance, and Russian anger at the expansion of NATO 
membership in central Europe and the Baltic states, it is remarkable that Kazakh-
stan is able to actively work with NATO without repercussions on its relationship 
with Russia. Kazakhstan’s actions within the EEU and the UN, along with its 
positive relations with NATO, all demonstrate its success in establishing a foreign 
policy independent of Russia. Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a close, 
positive relationship with Russia while making foreign policy choices counter to 
Russian interests.
Despite growing important economic ties with China, the Kazakhstani govern-
ment has also repeatedly asserted its independence in relation to Beijing. As of 
2018, ‘China is Kazakhstan’s second-largest trading partner’ and its largest source 
of commercial loans.57 By 2017, China had invested almost US$30 billion in the 
Kazakhstani oil industry and its mining, transportation and agricultural sectors.58 As 
part of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, China has invested in infrastructure develop-
ments in Kazakhstan, including railway improvements and an expressway running 
from the Caspian Sea to the border between the two countries. China is clearly an 
important economic partner to Kazakhstan, which has used this economic rela-
tionship strategically to reduce its economic dependence on Russia. That said, the 
Kazakhstani government continues to restrict Chinese ownership of land and does 
not offer tourist visas to Chinese citizens.59 Another example of recent pushback 
against Chinese influence is the arrest in 2019 of a senior government adviser on 
charges of spying for China. The decision to leak information about the arrest to 
the Kazakhstani media can be viewed as a possible warning to Beijing.60
We see similar behaviour with regard to the EU and the United States, even 
though the location of these Great Powers means that they do not pose the same 
threat as Russia and China. The EU is the largest foreign investor in Kazakhstan 
and its largest trading partner,61 and is viewed by the Kazakhstani government as 
a major partner in its multivector foreign policy.62 Kazakhstan’s primary export to 
Europe is energy resources, and it has an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
55 Tanchum, ‘Kazakhstan’s western rebalancing’, p. 10.
56 Tanchum, ‘Kazakhstan’s western rebalancing’, p. 12.
57 Xing Xiaojing, ‘Belt and Road boom,’ Global Times, 26 Sept. 2018. See supporting statistical data at https://
wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KAZ/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/by-coun-
try and https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/kazakhstan/tradestats. 
58 Azhar Serikkaliyeva, Aidarbek Amirbek and Eftal Sukru Batmaz, ‘Chinese institutional diplomacy toward 
Kazakhstan: the SCO and the new Silk Road initiative’, Insight Turkey 20: 4, 2018, p. 139.
59 Xiaojing, ‘Belt and Road boom’.
60 Thomas Grove, ‘A spy case exposes China’s power play in central Asia’, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2019, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/a-spy-case-exposes-chinas-power-play-in-central-asia-11562756782.
61 European Commission, Kazakhstan, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/
kazakhstan/.
62 Luca Anceschi, ‘The tyranny of pragmatism: EU–Kazakhstani relations,’ Europe–Asia Studies 66: 1, 2014, p. 8.
INTA96_4_FullIssue.indb   985 26/06/2020   13:14
Rachel Vanderhill, Sandra F. Joireman and Roza Tulepbayeva
986
International Affairs 96: 4, 2020
Agreement with the EU. Although the United States is a less important trading 
partner (less than 5 per cent of Kazakhstani imports or exports are with the US), 
American energy companies are major investors in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector.63 
Yet despite the significance of these commercial relationships, Kazakhstan has 
managed to avoid instituting some governance reforms sought by the EU and the 
United States. Although the Kazakhstani government has rhetorically supported 
anti-corruption measures and other reforms promoted by the EU and the United 
States, actual change has been limited.64 For example, in 2007 the Kazakhstani 
foreign minister, Marat Tazhin, presented to the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) a comprehensive plan to ‘further Kazakhstan’s 
democratic progress, known as the “Madrid Commitments”’.65 However, the 2011 
Kazakhstani presidential elections and every subsequent election have violated 
those commitments.66 Despite these violations, the United States and the EU 
have maintained positive diplomatic and economic relations with Kazakhstan and 
have imposed no sanctions on the country for failing to develop democracy.67 
Furthermore, over time the Kazakhstani government has made things harder 
for foreign investors by repeatedly increasing the local content requirements for 
foreign companies and failing to comply with international arbitration rulings.68 
Therefore, even in the economic realm the Kazakhstani government has resisted 
pressure to bring about substantive domestic reforms that would bring it into line 
with EU and American policies.
Diverse mechanisms 
Omni-enmeshment involves engaging with Great Powers in such a way as to 
integrate them into regional or international society through multiple and diverse 
interchanges with the goal of preventing Great Power conflict or domination of a 
region. Kazakhstan, through its multivector foreign policy, has used a variety of 
mechanisms to ‘enmesh’ Great Powers in its region in ways that are positive for 
it purposes. It is clear that Kazakhstan has felt its survival as a state to be under 
threat, and has engaged in regional and international cooperation to protect its 
sovereignty and demonstrate its value as an independent state to the broader inter-
national community. For example, at the opening of the International Congress 
of Industrialists and Engineers in 1993, Nazarbayev noted:
I have often been asked why I consistently campaigned for economic integration between 
the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] members ever since the Commonwealth 
was created. I was certainly aware that a lot of the integration initiatives were somewhat 
63 ‘Kazakhstan imports’, Trading Economics, 2019, https://tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/imports.
64 Rachel Vanderhill, Sandra F. Joireman and Roza Tulepbayeva, ‘Do economic linkages through FDI lead to 
institutional change? Assessing outcomes in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan’, Europe–Asia Studies 71: 
4, 2019, pp. 1–23.
65 OSCE, Kazakhstan and the so-called Madrid Commitments, background documents, review conference, Warsaw, 
30 Sept.–8 Oct 2010 (Vienna, 1 Oct. 2010).
66 Anceschi, ‘The tyranny of pragmatism’, p. 16.
67 Vanderhill et al., ‘Do economic linkages through FDI lead to institutional change?’.
68 Vanderhill et al., ‘Do economic linkages through FDI lead to institutional change?’.
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premature, but I consciously continued to put them forward ...  I am firmly convinced that 
without effective integration not one of the ex-Soviet republics can achieve significant 
economic results.69
In the same year, Nazarbayev used even stronger language to emphasize that 
state survival for Kazakhstan was dependent on its economic and regional ties:
I believe that the CIS is necessary in the interests of securing a normal life for all people, 
guaranteeing their social protection, preventing forced migration, creating the conditions 
for economic stabilization, and the realization of large-scale programmes of develop-
ment.70 
At the same time as Nazarbayev defended regional economic ties, he balanced 
this emphasis with a strong defence of sovereignty:
Kazakhstan consistently defends the idea of economic integration. However, there mustn’t 
be any encroachment on our sovereignty or interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
and the right of each people to determine the social system in its own country must be 
respected.71
We believe that Kazakhstan’s concern with state survival has led to two strat-
egies of omni-enmeshment within its multivector foreign policy. The first is 
evident in the assertions of sovereignty and independence discussed above with 
regard to Kazakhstan’s relations to the Great Powers. The second is expressed in 
multilateral diplomacy at the regional and international levels. In this section we 
will explore the second of these strategies.
Multilateral diplomatic efforts might be seen as reflecting Kazakhstan’s desire 
to be a good international citizen, but it is clear that it has more invested in its 
efforts than good citizenship alone. As we will demonstrate below, Kazakhstan 
views its diplomatic efforts as a means to develop a web of sustained relationships 
with regional states and Great Powers and thereby to prevent regional conflict that 
would threaten its sovereignty and security. Thus these diplomatic ‘enmeshments’ 
both assert Kazakhstani sovereignty and seek to build multiple, interconnected 
ties with other states. In considering these engagements, it is worth reflecting on 
how unusual it is to see this sort of diplomatic activity from a central Asian state. 
Enmeshment as we conceive of it here is not a type of central Asian supranational 
project, but a Kazakhstani foreign policy strategy based on the preservation of 
sovereignty and the autonomy of the state. 
Regionally, Kazakhstan has played an important role in organizations 
concerned with the political, economic and cultural spheres. For example, it has 
strengthened its relationship with Europe through its membership of the OSCE, 
and actively lobbied the United States and European members to become the first 
central Asian and former Soviet state to obtain the rotating chair of the organiza-
tion in 2010. The Kazakhstani government saw its chairing of the OSCE as a sign 
of international legitimacy and a successful example of its multivector approach 
69 Nazarbayev, Strategiya vechnoi druzhbi [The strategy of eternal friendship], pp. 371–4.
70 Nazarbayev, Strategiya vechnoi druzhbi [The strategy of eternal friendship], pp. 363–5.
71 Nazarbayev, Strategiya vechnoi druzhbi [The strategy of eternal friendship], pp. 387–9.
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to foreign policy. Responding to the OSCE’s announcement of the appointment, 
the Kazakhstani foreign minister stated that
since the first days of independence, Kazakhstan has made a conscious choice in favour of 
balanced approaches in foreign policy, and the strategy of multilateral partnership became 
its core . . . Kazakhstan has recommended itself as a supporter of active participation in 
resolving the problems of international security.72
While chairing the OSCE, Kazakhstan hosted the first OSCE summit in eleven 
years and oversaw the adoption of the Astana Commemorative Declaration, which 
restated support for OSCE principles.73 Kazakhstan’s continued valuable role in 
the OSCE was recently noted by the 2019 OSCE chairperson-in-office Miroslav 
Lajčák, who stated that ‘thanks to its balanced and pragmatic domestic and foreign 
policy, Kazakhstan is a reliable and trustworthy partner of the organization’.74
Kazakhstan also values its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO), of which it was one of the six founding members. In 2006, Nazarbayev 
stated that ‘Kazakhstan attaches huge significance to SCO and regards its interac-
tion with it as one of the priority trends in its foreign policy’.75 Kazakhstan has 
sought to play a leadership role in the SCO, which it chaired in 2011; it has also used 
the organization to support regional efforts to combat terrorism and, through the 
shared threat of terrorism, further build its relations with China: ‘Beijing appreci-
ates Astana’s understanding and tacit support regarding the antigovernment activ-
ities of some Uyghur groups in Xinjiang. This commonality of understanding 
is reflected in their declared goal of combating the “three evils”—terrorism, 
extremism, and separatism.’76 This ‘commonality of understanding’ is at least 
partially motivated by the fact that Kazakhstan also has a Uighur minority and 
concerns about Muslim militancy.77 Robert N. McDermott argues that Kazakh-
stan uses the SCO to help it avoid having to choose between Russia and China.78 
Nazarbayev himself stated that the ‘SCO was designed to eliminate the possi-
bility of the transition of existing and actualized border problems with China 
into a real military threat’ to Kazakhstan.79 Furthermore, in the event of a crisis in 
central Asia, the SCO provides an avenue through which Kazakhstan could have 
a voice in the Chinese or Russian response, and might enable it to prevent either 
state from acting unilaterally.80 Kazakhstan’s approach to the SCO is a form of 
72 ‘Kazakh OSCE presidency testament to democracy building’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 Dec. 2007.
73 OSCE, ‘Astana Declaration adopted at OSCE summit charts way forward’, press release, 2 Dec. 2010, https://
www.osce.org/cio/74236. 
74 ‘Kazahstan i OBSE sovmestniye usiliya dlya obespecheniya global’noi bezopasnosti’ [Kazakhstan and OSCE: 
joint efforts to ensure global security], press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 8 April 
2019, http://www.mfa.kz/ru/content-view/kazahstan-i-obse-sovmestnye-usilia-dla-obespecenia-globalnoj-
bezopasnosti. 
75 ‘Nazarbayev says SCO proves itself as powerful and promising organization’, Interfax, 14 June 2006.
76 Rouben Azizian and Elnara Bainazarova, ‘Eurasian response to China’s rise: Russia and Kazakhstan in search 
of optimal China policy’, Asian Politics and Policy 4: 3, 2012, p. 388.
77 Marcel De Haas, ‘Kazakhstan’s security policy: steady as she goes?’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 28: 4, 2015, 
p. 631.
78 Roger N. McDermott, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s impact on central Asian security: a view 
from Kazakhstan’, Problems of Post-Communism 59: 4, July–Aug. 2012, pp. 56–65.
79 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kriticheskoye desyatiletiye [Critical decade] (Almaty: Atamyra, 2003), p. 197.
80 McDermott, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s impact on central Asian security’, p. 64.
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‘soft balancing’, which avoids direct confrontation with a Great Power and instead 
seeks to use international institutions to restrain its actions.81
Kazakhstan further seeks to manage regional relations through its membership in 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a collective defence organiza-
tion founded in 2002. Unlike the SCO, it includes only post-Soviet states as members 
and focuses on security issues; Russia has by far the largest military capabilities of 
these states, making it the dominant actor in the CSTO. Moscow sees the CSTO 
as a way to legitimize Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and 
also as a way to counterbalance NATO and US military activities in the post-Soviet 
region.82 Therefore, Kazakhstan’s active membership in both the SCO and the 
CSTO may reflect efforts to ‘enmesh’ both China and Russia in regional institutions, 
and to use those institutions to help increase interdependence among Great Powers 
and reduce conflict. Kazakhstan’s consistent commitment to regional organizations 
stands in marked contrast to other central Asian states’ approaches to foreign policy, 
especially those of Turkmenistan, which has not joined any regional organization, 
and Uzbekistan, which pulled out of the CSTO in 2012.
Internationally, Kazakhstan is known for the renunciation of its nuclear 
arsenal, which it inherited after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This step 
earned Kazakhstan the status of a ‘global advocate of arms control and nuclear 
non-proliferation’, and the UN General Assembly has recognized 29 August, the 
day when ‘Kazakhstan shut down the Semipalatinsk testing ground, as the official 
International Day against Nuclear Tests’.83 Other proposals made and actions 
taken by Kazakhstan related to nuclear non-proliferation make it a leader in 
nuclear disarmament.84 In his recent address during a meeting of the UN General 
Assembly, President Tokayev reaffirmed the country’s commitment to eliminating 
nuclear weapons from the world and offered to host a new regional UN centre for 
sustainable development goals in Almaty.85
Another example of the country’s contribution to peace and security was its 
diplomatic role in hosting peace talks on the Syrian conflict. In 2015, Kazakhstan 
began the Astana Process, providing an international forum for talks attended by 
countries including Iran, Russia and Turkey in addition to the Syrian government 
81 Christopher Layne, ‘America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has 
arrived’, Review of International Studies 35: 1, 2009, p. 9.
82 B. Zh. Somzhurek, A. M. Yessengaliyeva, Zh. M. Medeubayeva and B. K. Makangali, ‘Central Asia and 
regional security’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 51: 2, 2018, p. 168.
83 Erzhan Kazykhanov, ‘Kazakhstan: building a nuclear-safe world’, American Ambassadors Review, Fall 2017, 
https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/fall-2017/kazakhstan-building-a-
nuclear-safe-world.
84 Kazakhstan played a leading role in the creation of the central Asian nuclear weapons-free zone, established on 
its territory a reserve bank for low-enriched uranium under the auspices of the IAEA, showcased its mediation 
efforts in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue and spearheaded the Universal Declaration on a Nuclear-Weap-
ons-Free World at the UN General Assembly. See Gultai Hasenova, ‘Proekt ATOM: 27 let bez yadernogo 
orujiya’ [ATOM project: 27 years without nuclear weapons], Strategy2050, 29 Aug. 2018, https://strategy2050.
kz/ru/news/51895/; UN Secretary General’s message to conference on ‘Building a nuclear-free world’, 28 
Aug. 2016, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-08-28/secretary-generals-message-build-
ing-nuclear-free-world-conference.
85 ‘Kazakh President affirms support for multilateralism in “a world of disquiet” during first address to UNGA’, 
Astana Times, 7 Oct. 2019, https://astanatimes.com/2019/10/kazakh-president-affirms-support-for-multilater-
alism-in-a-world-of-disquiet-during-first-address-to-unga/.
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and opposition. Nazarbayev proudly emphasized this initiative in his 2018 annual 
address to the nation: ‘The Astana Process on Syria is nearly the only effective 
working format of talks on a peaceful settlement and recovery of this country 
from the crisis!’86 Though the Kazakhstani government is not a direct participant 
in the talks,87 its role as host branded the negotiations with the former name of 
the capital city and raised its profile as an international actor.
These regional and international diplomatic efforts highlight Kazakhstan’s 
ability to act within the region and across the world to lead, convene and partici-
pate in diplomacy on a par with the Great Powers and in ways that draw them 
into a web of political and economic relationships—omni-enmeshment. There 
are, indeed, few states at a comparable level of development and size that play 
such a significant role in regional and international organizations. We argue that 
these efforts developed out of an initial need for state survival and have proved 
highly effective over time. In the wake of the seizure of Crimea, state survival has 
once again been an issue for Kazakhstan, and one that significantly influences its 
relations with Russia. The foreign policy strategy of multivectorism has ensured 
state survival via the assertion of a clear state identity and the pursuit of a complex 
set of relationships with both regional powers and Great Powers. As Raikhan 
Kaliyeva argues, a multivector foreign policy has enabled Kazakhstan to address 
the challenge of survival with dignity and to initiate a number of ambitious 
projects, such as launching a campaign on its entry into the top 50 most competi-
tive countries in the world.88 In the next section we provide an example of the 
way in which Kazakhstan has been able to use its relationships with Great Powers 
to engage in complex balancing for its own benefit.
Pipeline politics: an example of complex balancing
Along with pursuing strategies to ‘enmesh’ Great Powers in regional and interna-
tional order, Kazakhstan has also adopted complex balancing. As Goh explains, 
complex balancing is not focused on military alliances or balancing coercive power 
but rather uses other means, such as economic agreements, to increase the number 
of Great Powers that have a stake in regional security. Kazakhstan’s policy of 
seeking investment and engagement in its energy industry from all Great Powers 
is an example of complex balancing. 
At the time of independence, Kazakhstan’s pipelines all flowed towards Russia. 
Initially this made Kazakhstan dependent on Russian pipelines in order to access 
foreign markets. This was a problem especially for natural gas, as the Russian 
company Gazprom had a near monopoly over the pipelines, giving it the ability to 
control prices and reducing Kazakhstan’s revenues. However, since then Kazakh-
86 President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s annual address to the nation, 5 Oct. 2018, http://www.akorda.kz/en/
addresses/addresses_of_president/state-of-the-nation-address-of-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-
nursultan-nazarbayev-october-5-2018.
87 ‘Astana process: Kazakhstan will not be involved in talks—Vasilenko’, Kazinform, 23 Jan. 2017, https://www.
inform.kz/en/astana-process-kazakhstan-will-not-be-involved-in-talks-vasilenko_a2991731.
88 Kaliyeva, ‘Kazahstan v global’nom mire’ [Kazakhstan in the global world], p. 186.
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stan has been able to use China’s strong desire to secure energy supplies to reduce 
Russian leverage over its vital energy exports.89 The Kazakhstan–China pipeline, 
opened in 2005, brings oil from Kazakhstan’s deposits in the Caspian Sea directly 
to China, while the pipeline between central Asia and China, inaugurated in 2009, 
carries natural gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. 
The combination of these two pipelines provided access to foreign markets that 
bypassed Russia, granting Kazakhstan greater autonomy and enabling it to balance 
economically against Moscow.90 The planned development of the Trans-Caspian 
Gas Pipeline (TCGP) could give Kazakhstan access to the European market via 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. Kazakhstan’s international negotiations on the TCGP and 
the larger Southern Gas Corridor (an EU initiative to supply natural gas to Europe 
from the Caspian region) demonstrate its successful use of its valuable energy 
resources to gain concessions from different players. For years Nazarbayev was 
non-committal about whether or not Kazakhstan would participate in the TCGP, 
giving it leverage with both the EU and Russia. The EU, wanting to reduce its 
energy dependence on Russia, generally avoided exerting pressure on Kazakh-
stan about governance, democracy or human rights because it wanted access to 
Kazakhstani natural gas.91 In turn, Kazakhstan used the possibility of establishing 
the TCGP to gain concessions from Russia in relation to Gazprom and to move 
towards selling Kazakhstani natural gas to Europe.92 Omelicheva and Du argue 
that Kazakhstan follows a ‘strategy of inclusion’, which involves seeking foreign 
investment in its energy sector from Russian, Chinese, EU and US companies.93 
This inclusive strategy enables Kazakhstan to play off the various countries against 
one another and gain concessions from all of them, especially when they are 
weakened by other circumstances. Moreover, Kazakhstan has repeatedly managed 
to use its energy resources not only to gain such concessions, but also to ensure that 
Russia, China, the EU and the United States all have an interest in maintaining 
regional security. This strategy of complex balancing helps Kazakhstan to attract 
foreign investment for its essential energy industry and prevents any one Great 
Power from being economically dominant in the country. 
Conclusion 
Since the 1990s Kazakhstan has followed a foreign policy strategy of multivec-
torism. With this strategy, Kazakhstan has sought to build mutually beneficial 
relations with all the Great Powers engaged in central Asia—Russia, China, 
the EU and the United States. As seen from 2019, Kazakhstan had succeeded 
in maintaining its independence, attracting foreign investment and developing 
positive diplomatic relations with all the Great Powers. Although having an 
89 Cooley, Great games, local rules, p. 91.
90 Cesar B. Martinez Alvarez, ‘China–Kazakhstan energy relations between 1997 and 2012’, Journal of International 
Affairs 69: 1, Fall–Winter 2015, p. 62.
91 Anceschi, ‘The tyranny of pragmatism’, p. 9. 
92 Anceschi, ‘The tyranny of pragmatism’, p. 9.
93 Mariya Y. Omelicheva and Ruoxi Du, ‘Kazakhstan’s multi-vectorism and Sino-Russian relations’, Insight 
Turkey 20: 4, 2018, p. 102.
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economy dependent on natural resources can be problematic, these resources have 
helped Kazakhstan to achieve foreign policy success, as it has been able to use 
access to natural resources to exert leverage in its relations with Russia, China and 
the EU. We may say, then, that Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy is effective 
in protecting the state’s autonomy and achieving its goals.
Kazakhstan’s multivectorism has important theoretical implications. As noted 
above, there has been a general lack of theorizing about the foreign policy strategies 
of secondary powers. Realism does not focus on secondary powers and underex-
plains their actions.94 Also, Kazakhstan’s strategic choices do not align with the 
predictions of balance of power theory, which argues that it should be engaged in 
forming alliances against the more powerful, geographically proximate and possi-
bly aggressive Russia and the threat of a rising China. Instead, we see Kazakhstan 
maintaining strong, positive military and economic relations with Russia as well 
as developing important economic ties with China. Moreover, Kazakhstan follows 
a strategy of bandwagoning and balancing at the same time. In contrast, Goh’s 
theory of omni-enmeshment and complex balancing, developed in the context 
of south-east Asia where states face similar challenges, offers a good explanation 
of Kazakhstan’s multivector strategy. Kazakhstan has combined clear assertions 
of its sovereignty with deliberate efforts to ‘enmesh’ Russia, China and the EU in 
regional organizations to prevent Great Power conflict in central Asia. The celebra-
tion of the 550th anniversary of the Kazakh nation, independent voting in the UN 
and the refusal to support an expansive vision of the EEU are a few of the methods 
by which Kazakhstan has signalled its independence vis-à-vis Russia while at the 
same time maintaining Moscow as a valued strategic partner. Kazakhstan’s active 
promotion of regional organizations, such as the SCO and CSTO, is evidence of 
its desire to use these groupings to manage Great Power relations in the region.
The most remarkable aspect of this strategy is that Kazakhstan has maintained 
positive relations with all the Great Powers. The ability of secondary states to 
act independently and not just be subject to the demands of Great Powers is 
especially evident with Kazakhstan’s complex balancing around natural resources. 
Kazakhstan has been able to use the competing interests of Great Powers to its 
benefit, extracting concessions and avoiding economic dependence on any one 
market. Kazakhstan’s natural resources, geographic size and relatively high level 
of economic wealth have enabled it to follow a path of omni-enmeshment and 
complex balancing more successfully than its poorer, weaker central Asian neigh-
bours, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which have been forced into more 
dependent relationships with Russia and China.95 Cross-regional evidence from 
south-east Asia and Kazakhstan suggests that omni-enmeshment and complex 
balancing constitute a compelling theory of secondary states’ foreign policy strat-
egies. Indeed, they represent a strategic approach that should compel the attention 
94 Doug Lieb, ‘The limits of neorealism: marginal states and international relations theory’, Harvard International 
Review 26: 1, 2004, pp. 26–9.
95 For example, Russian soldiers have been stationed in Tajikistan since the 1992–7 civil war and Kyrgyzstan, 
under Russian pressure, ended an American lease at the Manas military base and instead agreed to allow Russia 
to lease a military base in the country. 
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of any state that is not a Great Power, given that when Kazakhstan embarked on 
its multivector strategy it did not have its current level of resource wealth and 
economic development. 
Kazakhstan, along with the rest of central Asia, is in a period of transition. 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have their first new presidents since independence, 
a development which has contributed to closer, more positive relations between 
the two states. Moreover, the significant increase in China’s economic and military 
power, along with its Belt and Road Initiative, is changing the balance of power 
in central Asia. Under these changing circumstances, will Kazakhstan continue 
its strategy of multivectorism? Will that approach to foreign policy remain effec-
tive? Early evidence suggests that the new Kazakhstani President, Kassym-Jomart 
Tokayev, will sustain multivectorism.96 In March 2020, Tokayev approved the 
new Foreign Policy Concept of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030, which is based on the 
principles of multivectorism, pragmatism and proactivity, aimed at developing 
friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with all states, and engaging in 
interstate associations and international organizations of practical interest for 
Kazakhstan.97 Moreover, Tokayev is now being given credit for ‘inventing’ the 
concept of multivector foreign policy back in 1996.98 Tokayev has already stated 
his support for more Kazakh-language education as part of a plan to reduce the 
use of Russian, a clear assertion of Kazakh independence in relation to Russia. 
With China now pursuing a more assertive foreign policy and having an increased 
interest in central Asia, we may see rising concerns within Kazakhstan about 
Chinese influence and power. A real test of Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign 
policy will come with the challenge of negotiating successfully with both a more 
aggressive Russia and a more assertive, powerful China.
96 ‘Mnogovektornaya strategiya budet ostavatsya prioritetom—President Tokayev’ [Multivector strategy will 
remain a priority], 2 April 2019, Zakon.kz, https://www.zakon.kz/4964074-mnogovektornaya-strategiya-
budet.html; see also ‘Tokayev vstretilsya s rukovoditelyami inostrannih dipmissii’ [Tokaev met with the heads 
of foreign diplomatic missions], press release by information agency Khabar, 26 Nov. 2019, https://khabar.kz/
ru/news/item/117483-k-tokaev-vstretilsya-s-rukovoditelyami-inostrannykh-dipmissij; Assel Nazarbetova, 
‘Zaslugi Tokayeva pered stranoi kak diplomata neozenimi’ [Tokayev’s service to the country, as a diplomat, 
is invaluable] , KazISS (online publication by Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies), 17 May 2019, http://
www.kisi.kz/index.php/ru/publikatsii/180-nazarbetova-asel-kozhakhmetovna/2700-zaslugi-tokaeva-pered-
stranoj-kak-diplomata-neotsenimy.
97 Decree of the President of Kazakhstan on the Foreign Policy Concept of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030, 6 March 
2020, https://www.akorda.kz/ru/legal_acts/decrees/o-koncepcii-vneshnei-politiki-respubliki-kazahstan-na-
2020-2030-gody; see also ‘Kazahstan prodlit mnogovektornuyu vneshnuyu politiky’ [Kazakhstan to extend 
multivector foreign policy], RIA Novosti, 12 June 2019, https://ria.ru/20190612/1555506307.html.
98 S. Frederick Starr, ‘First glimpses of Tokayev’s Kazakhstan: the listening state?’, Atlantic Council, 17 Sept. 
2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/long-take/first-glimpses-of-tokayevs-kazakhstan/. 
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